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Using All Raw Keys for Parameter Estimation and
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Abstract—High efficiency postprocessing of continuous-
variable quantum key distribution system has a significant impact
on the secret key rate and transmission distance of the system.
Currently, the postprocessing mainly contains four steps in the
following order: sifting, parameter estimation, information recon-
ciliation, and privacy amplification. For a quantum channel with
unknown prior characteristics, part of the raw keys (typically
half) have to be sacrificed to estimate the channel parameters,
which is used to assist in error correction (part of information
reconciliation) and estimate the secret key rate. This introduces
a tradeoff between the secret key rate and the accuracy of
parameter estimation when considering the finite-size effect. In
this paper, we propose a high efficiency postprocessing method
which uses all the raw keys for both parameter estimation
and key extraction. It is realized by exchanging the order of
parameter estimation and information reconciliation, while the
other steps remain unchanged. After the sifting step, the extra
data (used for phase compensation and synchronization etc) can
be used to roughly estimate the quantum channel parameters, or
using the estimated results of last block, thus the error correction
can be realized normally. After the success of error correction,
the reconciler recovers the raw keys of the other side by a
reverse mapping function. Then she uses all the raw keys of
both sides for parameter estimation to estimate the quantum
channel parameters and calculate the secret key rate of the
system. Finally, they perform the privacy amplification step to
obtain the unconditional security keys. We show that this method
improves the accuracy of parameter estimation and the secret key
rate of continuous-variable quantum key distribution system.
Index Terms—Continuous-variable quantum key distribution,
postprocessing, parameter estimation, finite-size effect.
I. INTRODUCTION
Q
UANTUM key distribution (QKD) [1] is a major prac-
tical application of quantum information technology,
which allows two distant legitimate parties (named Alice and
Bob) to extract unconditional secure keys though an insecure
quantum channel which may be controlled by an eavesdropper
(named Eve) and a classical authentication channel. There are
mainly two kinds of QKD protocols, they respectively encode
information on discrete variables [2], [3] and continuous vari-
ables (CV) [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. CV-QKD takes the advantage
of using standard telecommunication technologies [9], [10],
[11], [12], and its security has been proven when using Gaus-
sian modulation coherent states. A CV-QKD protocol contains
quantum states preparation, transmission, measurement, and
postprocessing, where the imperfect postprocessing is one of
the main bottlenecks that limits its property. The efficiency
and the speed are two main targets of postprocessing. Several
works have been done to improve the speed [13], [14], [15].
In this paper, we focus on improving the efficiency of the
postprocessing.
Currently, in the postprocessing part, the raw keys after
quantum state measurement have to be divided into two parts.
One part is used for parameter estimation, and the other
part is used for key extraction. Typically, the data used for
the first part is about 50%. The major purpose of parameter
estimation is to estimate the secret key rate that can be
extracted from the raw keys used for key extraction. The
accuracy of parameter estimation has a great influence on
secret key rate and transmission distance of CV-QKD system
when considering the finite-size effect [16], [17].
The finite-size effect of parameter estimation has been
analyzed in many CV-QKD protocols [16], [17] and
continuous-variables measurement-device-independent QKD
protocols [18], [19]. They all need to sacrifice part of the
raw keys and are limited by the accuracy of parameter es-
timation. Cosmo Lupo et al. [20] proposed a method that
does not sacrifice raw keys by displacing the variables after
detection based on an affine function in continuous-variables
measurement-device-independent QKD protocols. In CV-QKD
protocols, Leverrier [21] proposed a method based on quantum
tomography, in which all the raw keys can be used for both
parameter estimation and key extraction. He introduced two
additional parties to Alice and Bob, and the modes of quantum
states are also divided into two parts, then distribute them
to each of the additional party for both sides. Each of the
additional party can estimate the covariance matrices of the
other’s quantum states. Although this method does not waste
raw keys, he pointed out that it is rather impractical. Therefore,
it is necessary to propose a practical high efficiency method
in CV-QKD protocols that does not sacrifice raw keys and
parameter estimation is accurate.
To solve this problem, we exchange the implementation
order of parameter estimation and information reconcilia-
tion [22], [23] in the postprocessing of CV-QKD protocols,
so that the whole raw keys can be used for both parameter
estimation and key extraction. First, the channel characteristics
are roughly estimated by using the extra data used for phase
compensation and synchronization etc, or using the parameter
estimation results of the previous block. For a stable CV-QKD
system, the channel characteristics change very slowly. There-
2fore, the results of the latter method maybe more accurate
because the amount of data used for parameter estimation is
far larger than the former method. Then they choose a suitable
error correction code according to the parameter estimation
results. Next, they correct the errors between them to share
corrected keys. Finally, the error correction party can recover
the other party’s raw keys if the error correction successes.
This is achieved by a reversible mapping function based on
multidimensional reconciliation [24]. After this process, she
can estimate the parameters of the quantum channel with the
raw keys of both side without public communication. Because
the whole raw keys are used for both parameter estimation and
key extraction, the results of parameter estimation are more
accurate, and the data utilization is high. We will show that
the proposed method obviously improves the secret key rate
and transmission distance.
II. HIGH EFFICIENCY POSTPROCESSING FOR CV-QKD
A CV-QKD protocol contains the quantum part and the
classical postprocessing part. In the quantum part of prepare-
and-measure scheme, Alice prepares quantum states and dis-
tributes them to Bob though an insecure quantum channel, Bob
measures them by a homodyne detector or a heterodyne de-
tector. After the measurement, the raw keys of both parties are
classical Gaussian variables. The classical postprocessing part
mainly includes four steps: base sifting, parameter estimation,
information reconciliation, and privacy amplification [25],
[26].
The purposes of postprocessing are to estimate the char-
acteristics of quantum channel, correct errors, and extract
secret keys. The detailed process is described as follows:
(1) Base sifting: Bob records the quadratures he measures
and broadcasts them to Alice. Alice keeps the corresponding
Gaussian variables. Then, they share the relevant raw keys.
They keep one of the quadrature values if Bob performs a
homodyne detection, while both of the quadrature values are
kept if Bob performs a heterodyne detection. (2) Parameter
estimation: Alice and Bob disclose part of the raw keys to
estimate the characteristics of quantum channel and to obtain
an upper bound on the information of eavesdropper Eve. All
the characteristics of the quantum channel can be expressed
by a covariance matrix of the raw keys shared by Alice and
Bob. Then, Alice and Bob can calculate a secret key rate
lower bound that can be extracted from the rest part of the
raw keys. (3) Information reconciliation: In our scheme, this
step is divided to multidimensional reconciliation and error
correction. Alice and Bob rotate their raw keys to build a
binary input additional white Gaussian noise channel by a
mapping function. Then, they correct the errors between them
by a linear block code, such as low density parity check
(LDPC) code [27], [28]. Finally, they further check whether
there are still errors between them by error verification. (4)
Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob apply a universal hash
function to their corrected keys and compress them according
to the secret key rate obtained from the parameter estimation
step. Eve has nearly zero information on the final secure keys.
For a practical CV-QKD protocol, finite-size effect has to
be considered when computing the secret key rate. Suppose
that x and y are the raw keys of Alice and Bob, and E refers
to the quantum state of Eve. For the asymptotic regime, the
secret key rate is given by
Kasy = I(x : y)− S(y : E), (1)
where I(x : y) is the Shannon mutual information of Alice and
Bob, S(y : E) is the maximum Holevo information of Bob
and Eve. In this paper, we use reverse reconciliation because
it can beat 3dB loss limit [29], and the transmission distance
is farther than direct reconciliation. For direct reconciliation,
S(y : E) is replaced by S(x : E). This analysis is secure
against collective attacks.
In the finite-size case, the secret key rate can be expressed
as [16]:
Kfinite =
n
N
[βI(x : y)− SǫPE (y : E)−∆(n)], (2)
where N is the total number of data exchanged by Alice and
Bob, n is the number of data used for key extraction, and
the other m = N − n data is used for parameter estimation.
β is reconciliation efficiency which means the proportion of
information extracted from I(x : y), it ranges from 0 to 1.
SǫPE (y : E) is the upper bound of information that Eve
can obtain from the information of Bob when considering
the finite-size effect, where ǫPE is the failure probability of
parameter estimation. This results in overestimating the ability
of Eve and underestimating the secret keys rate of CV-QKD
system. In most CV-QKD protocols, the raw data used for
parameter estimation need to be disclosed, therefore it can not
be used for key extraction, which reduces the data utilization.
And parameter estimation only uses part of the raw keys, thus
the results of parameter estimation are inaccurate, they only
exist in confidence regions with a certain probability. The value
of ǫPE can be decreased by increasing the size of raw data
used for parameter estimation, while this will decrease the
secret key rate. Thus, this introduces a tradeoff between the
accuracy of parameter estimation and the secret key rate in
the case of finite-size regime. ∆(n) is related to the security
of privacy amplification. Its value is given by [16]
∆(n) ≡ (2dimHY + 3)
√
log2(2/ǫ)
n
+
2
n
log2(1/ǫPA), (3)
where HY is the Hilbert space corresponding to the variable
of Bob, ǫ is a smoothing parameter, and ǫPA is the failure
probability of privacy amplification. Although the Hilbert
space of the raw data is infinite, the final secret key rate is
less than 1 bit per pulse generally. Thus, for some CV-QKD
protocols, the keys are encoded on bits, and this allows users
to take dimHY as 2 for parameter estimation. The parameter
ǫ is related to the speed of convergence of the smooth min-
entropy of the quantum states. The parameter ǫPA is the
failure probability of privacy amplification, which indicates
the probability of having the same output for different input
when perform the privacy amplification process by a universal
hash function. Both of the two parameters can be optimized.
In the following, we describe a high efficiency postprocess-
ing method for CV-QKD systems. This not only obtains more
accurate results of parameter estimation, but also improves the
secret key rate. The proposed method does not waste any raw
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keys and improves the data utilization. The process of high
efficiency postprocessing for CV-QKD is illustrated in Fig. 1.
As shown in Fig. 1, the high efficiency Gaussian modulation
coherent-state CV-QKD system mainly contains two parts: the
physical part and the postprocessing part. The first part in-
cludes quantum state preparation, transmission, and detection.
In this part, Alice first generates light sources with a laser,
and prepares Gaussian coherent states by Gaussian modu-
lation. Then, she sends the quantum states to Bob through
an untrusted quantum channel which can be controlled by
a potential eavesdropper Eve. Finally, Bob uses homodyne
detector or heterodyne detector to measure the quantum states.
Actually, in the practical systems, due to the imperfections of
quantum channel and the influence of other factors, Alice has
to send Bob some extra data to complete the functions of phase
compensation and synchronization etc.
The second part includes base sifting, information reconcil-
iation, parameter estimation, and privacy amplification. This
part is implemented through a classical authentication channel
which means Eve can eavesdrop on the message exchanged
between Alice and Bob but she can not modify them without
being discovered. The first step of the postprocessing is base
sifting. This step is completed according to the type of detector
used to measure the quantum states. If Bob uses homodyne
detector, he randomly measures one of the quadratures and
records it. When this process is executedN times, Bob informs
Alice the quadratures he measured. Then, Alice saves the
data with the same quadratures. Finally, they will share a
set of related Gaussian variables with length N . While if
Bob uses heterodyne detector, both of the quadratures are
measured. Therefore, after N times of quantum measurement
process, Alice and Bob have a set of related Gaussian variables
with length 2N , which is 2 times of the homodyne detector
protocol.
The main difference of the proposed high efficiency CV-
QKD is that we exchange the execution order of information
reconciliation and parameter estimation. Next, we will de-
scribe how to perform information reconciliation step without
parameter estimation. This means that the whole raw keys
can be used to extract secret keys. We first introduce the
principle of information reconciliation. This process has two
modes: direct reconciliation and reverse reconciliation [29].
The former mode uses Alice’s data as raw keys, and Bob tries
to recovery them. While the latter mode uses Bob’s data as
raw keys, and Alice tries to recovery them. Both of the modes
have the same Shannon mutual information between Alice
and Bob, however the information that Eve eavesdrop from
Alice and Bob is different. In the direct reconciliation mode,
Eve can directly eavesdrop the information of Alice from the
quantum channel. While in the reverse reconciliation mode,
Eve can only obtain the information from Bob indirectly.
Therefore, when the channel loss is larger than 3dB, Eve
may obtain more information from Alice than Bob in the
direct reconciliation mode. In this paper, we mainly focus on
long distance CV-QKD system. Thus, we choose the mode of
reverse reconciliation.
In a low signal-to-noise ratio CV-QKD system, this process
can be divided into three steps: multidimensional reconcili-
ation, error correction, and error verification. The first step
of this process is an efficient method to extract secret keys
from Gaussian variables. The second step is to correct errors
between Alice and Bob. The purpose of the last step is
to further ensure the consistency of the keys after error
correction.
Multidimensional reconciliation can construct an virtual
binary input additive white Gaussian noise (BIAWGN) channel
through rotating the Gaussian variables of Alice and Bob. We
will describe this step in detail because that it is the key factor
to achieve the proposed method. To clearly describe this step,
we define the following symbols. Let x and y be the raw keys
of Alice and Bob. For a linear AWGN channel, they satisfy
the following relationship y = tx + z with x ∼ N (0, VA),
z ∼ N (0, σ2), and y ∼ N (0, t2VA + σ2), where t is related
to the loss of quantum channel, and z refers to the Gaussian
noise. In the reverse reconciliation mode, their relationship
can be rewritten as x = t′y + z′ with z′ ∼ N (0, σ′2). The
details of multidimensional reconciliation [24] are described
as follows:
(1) Suppose that the dimension is d, and it is 8 in our
scheme. Alice and Bob first randomly or sequentially divided
4their raw keys into N/d (2N/d for heterodyne detector) d-
dimensional strings xd and yd respectively.
(2) Alice and Bob normalize their Gaussian variables, such
that x′d = xd/||xd||, ||xd|| = √〈xd,xd〉, and y′d =
y
d/||yd||, ||yd|| =√〈yd,yd〉.
(3) Bob randomly chooses a string u ∈ {−1/√d, 1/√d}d
with uniform distribution on the d-dimensional hypercube.
Then he calculates a function which satisfies M(y′d,u)y′d =
u and sends M(y′d,u) to Alice. Alice applies this function
to her data to obtain v = M(y′d,u)x′d.
After multidimensional reconciliation step, Alice and Bob
have the strings v and u. Then they use the channel coding
technology to correct the errors between them. Multi-edge type
low density parity check (MET-LDPC) codes [30], [28] are the
generalization of LDPC codes, whose performances are close
to Shannon’s limit. Alice and Bob choose a MET-LDPC code
with suitable code rate according to the parameters of quantum
channel. However, the parameter estimation process has not
been completed, and they do not have a prior information on
the quantum channel. Fortunately, this step does not require
precise results of channel characteristics. Thus, they can use
the extra data to roughly estimate the parameters. These extra
data are used to complete the functions of phase compensation
and synchronization etc. They not only do not affect the
security of CV-QKD systems, but they can also characterize
the performance of quantum channel. However, because the
amount of the extra data is small, the results may not be
accurate. Although the error correction step does not require
precise results, it will affect the performance of the information
reconciliation.
Thus, we introduce another method to obtain more accurate
results. For a stable CV-QKD system, the channel character-
istics change very slowly. All the data of the first block are
used to estimate the channel characteristics. From the second
block, all the data can be used for both parameter estimation
and key extraction. And the parameter estimation results of
the previous block are used to assist in error correction step.
The results of this method maybe more accurate because the
amount of data used for parameter estimation is far larger
than the former method. The parameters related to this step
are mainly the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), noise variance σ2,
quantum channel transmission t etc. The first parameter is
used to select a suitable MET-LDPC code. And the other
parameters are used to assist in decoding. They satisfy the
following relationship:
SNR =
t2VA
σ2
. (4)
SNR has an influence on selection of the rate of MET-
LDPC codes and affects the performance of error correction.
As shown in Fig 2, the SNRs of the two adjacent blocks of
data are very close, the impact on the performance can be
ignored. The deviations of the previous methods have also
been shown in the Fig 2. The results show that the deviations
are similar for both of the methods, and they are all less than
1.5× 10−4 (about 0.5% of the actual SNRs), which has small
effect on the performance of error correction. The other two
parameters are used to assist decoding initialization of MET-
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the raw data is used for parameter estimation), while the red line refers to the
results of proposed method.
LDPC codes. Actually, the decoding is only related to the
SNRs. Therefore, as long as the SNRs are fixed, the other two
parameters will not affect the decoding results. If the quantum
channel is mutated, i.e. the deviations of the two adjacent
blocks are quite large, then the quantum channel parameters
need to be reestimated by using the first block of data after
the mutation.
Reconciliation efficiency β refers to the error correction
performance. Its value is given by β = R/C in multidi-
mensional reconciliation, where R is the code rate of MET-
LDPC and C is the capacity of quantum channel, such that
C = 1/2log2(1+SNR). The precise β can be obtained after
parameter estimation when we get the accurate SNR.
Error verification step is executed to ensure the consistency
of secret keys. Alice and Bob respectively compute a hash of
their keys after error correction and publicly compare it. If
the comparison result is the same, their keys are considered to
be consistent. Otherwise, they abandon the keys. This method
is worked because that even if there is only a few keys are
different between them, their hash will be totally different with
a high probability.
In the following, we introduce how to realize parameter
estimation without publicly transmitting any raw keys when
the error correction successes. In other words, the raw keys
are used for both key extraction and parameter estimation.
Alice (in the reverse reconciliation mode, for Bob in the direct
reconciliation mode) could recover the raw keys of Bob after
the error correction successes. This method is implemented
based on reverse multidimensional reconciliation. Multidimen-
sional reconciliation is used to map Gaussian distributed data
to uniformly distributed binary data by rotation. Because the
mapping function is reversible, the mapped binary data can
be recovered to the original Gaussian data by reverse rotation.
The data recovery process is as follows:
(1) Alice and Bob have the same bit strings u after in-
5formation reconciliation. Alice computes the inverse function
M(y′d,u)−1 of mapping function M(y′d,u).
(2) Alice calculates the results of the inverse function
multiplied by the bit strings. Then Alice gets the normalized
results of the raw keys of Bob.
y
′d = M(y′
d
,u)−1u. (5)
(3) Alice calculates the results of y′d multiplied by the norm
of yd. It is given by
y
d = y′
d||yd||, (6)
where ||yd|| is sent from Bob to Alice when Bob sends the
mapping function y′d. All the d-dimensional strings yd make
up y.
The security of multidimensional reconciliation has been
proved. The mapping function y′d does not give any informa-
tion about u, and the norm of yd does not affect the security.
The data recovery process does not require communications,
thus it has no effect on the security of CV-QKD system.
Now, we consider the situation where error correction fails.
If the error correction fails, including failing to pass error
verification, Alice can not recover the raw keys of Bob. In the
previous systems, the data will be abandon. However, these
data can also characterize the characteristics of the quantum
channel. Therefore, in order to improve the data utilization,
Bob sends these data to Alice for parameter estimation. More
importantly, this helps Alice and Bob to accurately grasp the
characteristics of quantum channel.
Through the above process, Alice has both of the raw keys
x and y whether the error correction successes or not. Then
she can use the whole raw keys for parameter estimation. In
other words, no raw key is wasted and it improves the data
utilization.
The main purpose of parameter estimation is to estimate
the secret key rate by the characteristics of quantum channel.
This can be completed by the covariance matrix of the state
shared by Alice and Bob. For a Gaussian modulation CV-QKD
system, the covariance matrix can be given by
Γ =
(
(VA + 1)I2
√
ηTZσz√
ηTZσz (ηTVA + 1 + ηT ξ + vel)I2
)
, (7)
where VA is the modulation variance of Alice, η is the detector
efficiency, T is the quantum channel transmission, ξ is excess
noise, vel is electrical noise, I2 is a two-dimensional unit
matrix, σz=diag(1,-1), and Z =
√
V 2A + 2VA. As mentioned
before, for a linear AWGN channel, the data of Alice and Bob
satisfies the following relation:
y = tx+ z, (8)
where t =
√
ηT , and the variance of z is σ2 = 1+ ηT ξ+ vel.
Therefore, as shown in Eq. 7, one only needs to estimate t
and σ2. Maximum-likelihood estimators tˆ and σˆ2 are known
for the normal linear model [16]:
tˆ =
∑N
i=1 xiyi∑N
i=1 x
2
i
, (9)
σˆ2 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(yi − tˆxi)2, (10)
where xi and yi are N (for homodyne detector, 2N for
heterodyne detector) couples of correlated sampling Gaussian
variables. The distributions of tˆ and σˆ2 are:
tˆ ∼ N (t, σ
2∑N
i=1 x
2
i
), (11)
Nσˆ2
σ2
∼ χ2(N − 1), (12)
where t and σ2 are the true values of the parameters. To ensure
the system security, a minimum secret key rate is obtained
with a probability of 1-ǫPE when t is minimum and σ
2 is
maximum. In the limit of largeN , one can get tmin and σ
2
max:
tmin ≈ tˆ−△t and σ2max ≈ σˆ2 +△σ2, (13)
where △t = zǫPE/2
√
σˆ2
NVA
, △σ2 = zǫPE/2 σˆ
2
√
2√
N
, zǫPE/2
is such that 1 − erf(zǫPE/2/
√
2)/2 = ǫPE/2, and the error
function erf(x) is defined as:
erf(x) =
2√
π
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt. (14)
Once the values of tmin and σ
2
max are determined, one can
compute the maximum value of Holevo information SǫPE (y :
E) between Bob and Eve except with a probability of ǫPE .
Finally, in our proposed method, when considering the finite-
size effect, the secret key rate can be modified as:
Kfinite = βI(x : y)− SǫPE (y : E)−∆(n). (15)
Since the whole raw keys are used for both key extraction
and parameter estimation, both of the secret key rate and the
accuracy of parameter estimation are improved.
The last step of postprocessing is privacy amplification
which is used to extract secure keys from Alice and Bob’s
data and eliminate the information eavesdropped by Eve. Alice
randomly chooses a hash function from universal hash families
and sends to Bob. Both of them use this hash function to
compress their keys after error correction according to the
results of parameter estimation.
III. PERFORMANCE AND DISCUSSION
We have explained how to improve the secret key rate and
the accuracy of parameter estimation of CV-QKD systems. In
this section, we analyse the performance of the proposed high
efficiency postprocessing method for CV-QKD systems and
discuss the results. For a quantum channel with unknown prior
characteristics, Alice and Bob have to estimate the parameters
by using the correlated data shared by them. When considering
the finite-size effect, the length of the data used for parameter
estimation affects the secret key rate and transmission distance.
As shown in Eq. 2, the previous methods have to sacrifice part
of the raw keys, this leads to a reduction in the secret key rate
and the results of parameter estimation are inaccurate.
Assume that the previous methods sacrifice half of the raw
keys for parameter estimation, the other half is used for key
extraction. Fig. 2 shows the performance comparison between
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the proposed method and the previous methods. As shown
in Fig. 2, compared to the previous methods, the proposed
method has higher secret key rate and longer transmission
distance at different block lengthes. The main reason is that
the worst case needs to be considered when estimating the
parameters to ensure the security of the system. Therefore,
tmin and σ
2
max are used to compute the secret key rate.
However, because all the raw keys are used in the proposed
method, △t and △σ2 are smaller than the previous methods
so that a more tightness secret key rate is obtained. The results
show that the secret key rate and the transmission distance are
improved in the case of finite-size regime. In the asymptotic
regime, half of the raw keys can also accurately estimate the
parameters, thus the transmission distance is the same. While it
still sacrifice half of the data, the secret key rate is also reduced
by half. Thus, the high efficiency postprocessing method has
a good performance when there is no prior information on the
quantum channel.
IV. CONCLUSION
We presented a high efficiency postprocessing method for
CV-QKD, which can use all the raw keys for both parameter
estimation and key extraction. This method is implemented by
exchanging the execution order of parameter estimation and
information reconciliation. If the error correction successes,
Alice can recover the raw keys of Bob. While if the error
correction fails, Bob discloses his raw keys. Thus, Alice has
the raw keys of both side, she can estimate the characteristics
of quantum channel without wasting any raw keys. The results
show that our method improves the secret key rate and
transmission distance. This method has been applied in the
longest field test of CV-QKD system [12].
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